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PREFACE
There Is much that goes on In the business of running
the government of the United >tates that is not understood by
many Americans, The very structure of our democracy provides
that the desires of the many will be decided by a very few; a
very few that are placed in office by the process of the free
election. We support the person, or the political party, which
we believe will best represent these desires.
This process has seen no significant change through the
years since the birth of our liberty, almost 190 years ago.
During those years there have been many crises, some of which
were resolved much better than others, and one, in fact, which
temporarily destroyed our Union. Yet, 100 years after that
particular disaster, we are still united, and have become the
wealthiest and proudest nation on earth.
We have great aspirations for the future and face
immediate challenges that our fathers, and even some of us,
early in our lifetimes, would not have believed possible in
this century.
We face this future with optimism clouded by a threat
of world destruction. We have many goals and we have planned
ways to reach many of them.
With all of this we seem to assume that we will be able




finances mentioned in the same breath,
late there has oeen much discussion regarding our
financial program. Primary emphasis is placed on current
economic conditions and methods to stimulate our growth. As
methods are suggested, which genially project deficits in
national income, attention is being focused on our national
debt and the consequences of it3 growth.
It is this national debt problem that receives primary
attention in this paper.
It is not the intent of these pages to resolve this
debt problem in one all-inclusive conclusion, or even to attempt
to resolve any portion of the problem. This will take years in
solution and even then, not in the same sense as we think of
solving problems to a one and only solution. The changing
times that face our country make the one solution as elusive as
the treasure that awaits the one who reaches the end of the
rainbow.
Rather, it is intended to provide some basis from which
to begin a program to determine, and advise, the public of the
situation in terms of possible consequences resulting from
various courses of action, i,e,, greater or lesser spending
available to those administering our financial policies in
government.
Inasmuch as this paper is, in a sense, a climax to a
very enlightening but trying scholastic year, there Is no more
appropriate place than here to pay tribute to those most
responsible for making Its completion possible. To my wife
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Anne, who, with everything else, was my chief typist and baby«
quieter, and to Dr. A. Rex Johnson, my director and chief

























Rise of Debt in Peacetime
letting Together
IV. TODAY 1 3 DILEMMA 26
The Driver Kakes His Choice
The Voices Are Raised









HI3T0R* OF THE UNITED STATED NATIONAL DEBT
Introduction
The pros and cons of the public debt, will, I have no
doubt, be considered by most economists as so threadbare
a topic that it is not worth writing about. 1
These are the words Dr, Alvin H. Hansen of Harvard University,
a leading economist and public debt authority, chose to begin
some remarks titled: "The Public Debt Reconsidered."
.vhy, then, should one who has had Just a slight contact
with the problem want to add more to this much-discussed
subject? The answer is quite obvious as one reads some of the
many relevant discussions. To relieve the reader of some of
this effort, It ultimately draws down to the questions: what
are we as a nation doing about our public debt? Do we have a
national policy? If so, what is it?
3efore we try to arrive at some conclusions regarding
these questions, perhaps it is well briefly to review some of
the history of our debt, and what Borne of our national leaders
believed.
It is not unusual to use the terms "public debt" and
"national debt" interchangeably, so at the outset it is perhaps
pertinent to clarify the terms.
Alvin H. Hansen, Economic Issues of the 1960*8 (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960), p. 211.

Technically, public debt and national debt are not
Identical, The terra "public debt" Includes the debt not
only of the federal government, but also of state and
local governments; "national debt" covers only the
federal government. 2
For the purpose of this discussion we are referring to
the national debt as defined by ; r. Harris, but the terms will
be used interchangeably.
Even in the earliest periods of our nation's existence
there were, as today, varying opinions concerning a national
debt, Alexander Hamilton, in a letter to Robert Morris on
April 30, 1731, said:
A national debt, If It is not excessive, will be to us a
national blessing.
As an early and forceful advocate, then later as the
first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton has come to
be regarded In economic and historic literature as the great
exponent and believer In the existence of a large national debt,
There is, however, at least one dissenter to this idea
concerning Hamilton.
'-trange as it may seem, Hamilton's actions and words both
repudiate any such doctrine. He was not an advocate of a
large national debt, and he did believe that the greatest
thrift and care should be exercised constantly In the use
of all public funds, 4
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2;3eymour E, Harris, The, National Debt and the New
Soonoatlos (New Yor : : -c-iraw-Hill ;3oo£ Co., Inc., 194-7), p. 2.
George ;3eldes (ed,), The Great Quotations (Lyle
Steward, H#X, i Caesar-Stuart 3ook Co,, i960), p. 295,
^oy A. Foulke, national Thrift and the Public Debt
New York: Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 19^4), p. 9.

1 86 1 , wrote
:
I place economy among the first and most important of
republican virtues, and public debt as the greatest of
the dangers to be feared.
5
In another letter to John Taylor in the same year, he
continued:
The principle of spending money to be paid by posterity,
under the name of funding, is but swindling futurity on
a large scale.
°
A few years later, writing to L. H. Coleman on April
26, 1824, Andrew Jackson said:
I am one of those who do not believe that a national debt
is a national blessing, but rather a curse to a republic,
inasmuch as it is calculated to raise around the
administration a moneyed aristocracy dangerous to the
liberties of the country.
7
Several months later, on July 4, 1824, he continued
his emphasis:
If a national debt is considered a national blessing, then
we can get on by borrowing. But as I believe it is a
national curse, my vow shall be to pay the national debt.
8
It is reasonably well known that he did, In fact, pay
off the national debt before he left the Presidency in 1835,
and considered it one of his greatest accomplishments during
his tenure in office. This feat has never since been
accomplished.
These quotations, from three of our well known early
->H. L. Mencken (ed.), A New Dictionary of Quotations
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957) , p. 263.
6 Ibld.
. p. 268.
Tseldes, op. cit. , p. 354.




4Americans, are but a few that can be found which indicate that
then, as today, the problem of a national debt was a matter of
much discussion, with varying degrees of concern. Time passes,
conditions change, but some problems continue. Through the
years they receive greater or lesser attention, but they do
continue.
In the days of Hamilton and the others, the figures
were different, but so were the conditions.
Borrowing from statistics contained in two booklets
concerning the public debt, it might be well to review our
governmental financial position in its early days.
9
The Federal Government began operations in 1790 with a
$75.9 million gross debt which amounted to ,M9.12 per capita.
This rose to ^127.3 million in 1816, primarily as a result of
the War of 1812, and fell to complete extinction in 1836.
Customs receipts accounted for over 90;£ of the revenue in
twenty-three of these years, Because of the war, our customs
receipts naturally fell off, and to help carry some portion of
the increased expenditures for financing the war, direct taxes
of a wide variety were enacted in 1813, for levying in 1814.
There was considerable discussion in the Congress concerning
these taxes before they were finally enacted.
These taxes covered such divergent sources as a duty on
carriages, a license upon distillers of spirituous liquors,
^Foulke, op, cit .
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., Finance Dept., The
Public Debt (Washington, D.C.: By the author, 1945).

a tax on auction sales (auction sales played a far greater
part In our early economy than today) , and a license tax
upon retailers of wines and spirituous liquors. 10
There were twelve years during this forty-eight-year
period where deficits were incurred, but the last, of less than
a million dollars, was in 1824.
1837-1366
This period began with a nominal deficit of #336,000 in
1837. Followed by an equal division of surplus and deficit
years, our debt in 1360 stood, nevertheless, at s?64.8 million,
or $2.06 per capita.
Financing the Civil War resulted in five of the next six
years showing deficits, with 1865* s $963.3 million net deficit,
standing out as a tremendous deficit at that time. In 1366,
the total debt was $2.8 billion, or $77.69 per capita.
The Civil War brought about the first taxing of incomes.
To assist in financing the war, though customs was still the
great provider, Congress enacted a tax on incomes in 1861. It
started with a 35 tax on incomes in excess of <?800 per annum,
and was increased in 1862, and again in 1865, until Incomes
between 1600 and $5 #000 were being taxed at 5* and above;
5,000 at \Oft The last rate provided revenue of 432 million
in 1865.
1866-1893
This period saw twenty-seven consecutive surplus years.
During that time the debt was reduced to $961.4 million, or
10Foulke, op. oit. . p. 21.

6414,49 per capita, in 1695.
This was a period of great prosperity. We were engaged
in winning the vest and expanding in that direction. The debt
was reduced 65. 1£. Expenditures were large, hut receipts were
larger. The income tax law was repealed in 1872, as a result of
these continuing yearly surpluses, but this action was really
Initiated because of the cry—"It's unconstitutional!"—being
raised. Customs revenues were still providing better than 50^
of the income; their highest contribution was 59.4?£ during the
period,
1893-1916
Customs began dropping below the 50't mark, and in only
six of these twenty-three years did it exceed that mark, the
highest being 52»7#i In 1893.
In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution
was ratified. This amendment revolutionized our national fiscal
policy and resulted in the income tax being our primary source
of revenue. In the early years, income tax furnished little
funds. For example, the income tax yield for 1914, 1915, and
1916 was only ^28, #41, and 4^68 million, respectively.
Nine years of surpluses and fourteen years of deficits
left us with #1.3 billion In debt, or $12.36 per capita, just
prior to our entry into World War I
.
1917-Present
The peak of the World War I debt was reached in August,
1919, with a total debt of i?26,6 billion, or ,250.18 per capita.

The federal income and excess profits taxes had now
begun to come into their own. In 1917, these two sources
provided J>2 f of all receipts, and in 1919, they represented
58.6'!. In contrast, customs receipts had dwindled to only 3.
of our Income in 1919* la a period of five short years, the
income and excess profits taxes had become our chief source of
Income,
The lowest post- ^/orId tfar I debt was §16 billion in
December, 1930, or % 129.66 per capita, coming after eleven
consecutive surplus years. The first deficit of the depression
years was in fiscal year 1 931 * The debt continued its upward
climb, reaching ,42,9 billion, or v 325. 63 per capita, by June
30, 1940. The debt rose rapidly during V»orld War II, and at
the close of hostilities, stood at 0262.6 billion, or almost
1 900 per capita.
There can be no question that financing the costliest
war in history meant a huge debt would be one of the
consequences. Although the war has been finished for almost
twenty years, where does our debt stand today? A brief look
at any chart on the subject Indicates that it continues to rise,
and now is in the vicinity of 1300 billion. A closer look shows
that we have only succeeded In making a token reduction in our
debt, five times since 1930, and, In fact, we have only had
six small budget surpluses during that period,
i?rom the foregoing history, even though we recognize
the differences in opinion that exist on the subject, the
pattern is well defined! Create a debt, if necessary, in time

of national emergency, but make an effort to reduce it In
times of peace.
The Pattern Changes
Through the decades, the debt has risen primarily during
war and depression and has fallen largely in response to the
basic philosophy that the national debt should be extinguished.
The debt was entirely paid off twenty-four years after the v,ar
of 1812, In the twenty-seven years after the Civil var, the
debt was reduced by almost two-third3, and in the ten years
after torld War I, the debt was reduced by one-third.
This has not been the pattern since 19^5* As almost
every American knows, our debt has been increasing. "Why?"
we ask. "Who has changed the rules?"
, the people of America, have changed them. A subtle
but important change seems to have occurred in the minds of the
American people and in the men whom they elect to public office.
There no longer seems to be concern about reducing the debt as
in the past. The prevailing mood seems to be that we can live
with this large debt.
Writing on the public debt in 19^5, r. William
. hithers said:
After the war, nevertheless, we shall have to decide
whether public debts and public spending are good or
evil, and it is to be hoped that we will not decide the
matter arbitrarily. '
'
Another authority, commenting on the same problem, wrote:
1t Wllliara Whithers, The Public Debt (New York: The
John Day Co., 1945), p. 3.

Until this basic issue of national policy is settled, we
shall inevitably drift in the direction indicated by the
new philosophy—-because the money appropriating authorities
can hardly be expected to muster sufficient resolution to
resist the persistent demands for increased public outlays
or to levy sufficiently heavy taxes to cover the
appropriations. The apparently easy way is, moreover,
always the popular way. Unless the issue is decided by
the process of intellectual discussion, it is likely to be
automatically determined by the temper and trends of the
times backed by the "educational activities" and pressures
of the spending agencies. '<-
ich of the writing in the 1940* s refers to the new
philosophy and inevitably raises issues to be considered in
managing the debt in the post-war years. One other feature is
almost always present. In general, the authors make no pretense
of answering the questions raised. The questions are more or
less placed "on the table" for discussion and consideration.
Judging from the controversy one hears and reads about
the subject, and the prominence it seems destined to play in the
current legislative session, the questions remain unanswered.
ith this thought in mind, it will be well to make a
hasty review of the schools of thought which are playing an
important role these days in our country's thinking on the
subject of fiscal policy.
12Harold G. Moulton, The .lew Philosophy of Public Debt





Throughout most of this country's history, there was
general agreement that the federal government should at least
attempt to balance its budget every year. It was considered
proper that the government should live within its means. <e
have seen from the foregoing that the effort to balance the
budget was very successful for a greater part of our history.
The public debt totaled only |63 million at the end of 1349,
over seventy years from the birth of our nation, but sixty
years from the time of our first assumption of a national debt. 1
?n in 1917, before our entry into World War I, our debt had
not reached the $3 billion level. 2
Philosophies or theories on budgets, with resulting
deficits or surpluses, have seen considerable change through
the years. Adam Smith and other classical economists generally
opposed government deficits. They were protagonists of balanced
budgets, debt retirement, and sound money policy.
Government is unproductive; it maintains unproductive
labor, whereas Industry maintains productive labor;
1 U.^., executive Office of the President, .iureau of the
Budget, The Budget in Brief . 1964 Fiscal Year (Washington, ^.C.
1





funding of the public debt means a corresponding
reduction of private capital—these were the keystones
of Smith 1 s views on the public debt.
3
They argued that government borrowing diverted oapltal
that was needed to build the private economy. Deficits were the
result of excessive government spending, and since borrowing is
politically easier than taxing, they believed that the power to
borrow only increased the temptation to spend.
David Ricardo, in England in the early 1800*3, had
similar ideas concerning the public debt, but his were much
more rigid and less compromising.
According to him, agriculture, commerce, and business
flourish best when not hampered by government interference:
distress of business is explained in no small part by the
dearth of capital, associated with the growth of the
public debt, and with profuse spending by individuals;
money spent by the state is withdrawn from the productive
capital of the nation; it is the provision of the loan
rather than the continued transfers of interest which
accounts for the destruction of capital; if public
spending is absolutely necessary, then the State should
have recourse to taxes, not loans. Yet Rieardo, in
contrast to many other writers of the period, would not
cancel a public debt; for one man's gain would be
another man's loss. 4
This was the thinking of the economists through the
early history of our country. It was this "live within your
means" attitude; which dominated our thinking in the early years
of tho twentieth century. Simply stated, holders of this view
believe that a continuously unbalanced budget and rapidly
rising public debt imperil the f inanoial stability of the
nation. ound fiscal policy requires holding a nation's
indebtedness to as low a level as possible.




It was not until the middle 1930*8, when the expected
recovery failed to reach the stage of prosperity or to alleviate
the unemployment situation, that attention started to shift to
the use of public expenditures as a positive and primary force
in promoting economic recovery.
The name of John Maynard Keynes, a British economist,
is usually mentioned as giving Impetus to this shift in thinking*
During a visit to this country in 1934, he argued:
. . . the stimulating effects of a really abundant
outpouring of publio funds would prime the industrial
pump and thus generate a thorough go ins recovery and
expansion of private business activity. During the early
days of pump priming no one appeared to doubt that the
budget would In due course balance itself— as a result of
the simultaneous expansion of tax revenues and contraction
of government expenditures which would accompany a period
of prosperity, 3
r. oulton points out later that from what he has been
able to find in 'eynes 1 published writings, Keynes never
contended that pump priming would have to be continued
permanently, or that an Indefinite expansion of the publio debt
would carry no dangers.
Nevertheless, history tells us that, beginning in the
middle of 1936, there was a substantial expansion of business.
It appeared that the pump priming was living up to its
expectations. Then, with prosperity really "Just around the
corner/' the "boom" disappeared, followed by a new depression.
muse of the expanding national income which had
increased tax revenues, the government* s net contribution
%oulton, on. clt. . p. 15.
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to purchasing power had been reduced to negligible proportions.
It was not long before the exponents of the spending
philosophy took the position that the new depression was the
direct result of the shrinkage in the government's contribution
to purchasing power.
At the same time that new thinking aoout monetary and
credit policy was evolving, the continued deficits of the 1930's
led to the gradual acceptance of a new budget policy and a new
attitude toward the growing public debt.
6
The philosophy of expenditure in emergency but reduction
of debt in periods of prosperity was meeting opposition.
The New
The Keynes ian position began to develop appeal, and the
Influence of Dr. Alvln Hansen became Important in this country.
Keynes himself did not elaborate the role of fiscal policy In
the maintenance of full employment, but Dr. Hansen and the
Keynes ians did, Hansen argued that fiscal policy had been
forced to serve as a compensatory device more by accident than
by design. ^ Public finance had been broadened by the political
necessity of coping with unemployment. Most of the principles
intended to cover public debt polioy had been borrowed from
private finance, but the analogies were misleading.
^Paul J. Strayer, Fiscal Policy and Politics (New York:
Harper and Bros., 1958), pp . 15-16.
?Alvln H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and iuslness Cycles
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1941), pp. 135-222.
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If one adopts wholeheartedly the principle that government
financial operations should be regarded exclusively as
Instruments of economio and public policy, the concept of
a balanced budget, however defined, can play no role in the
determination of that policy,
°
Hansen contended that success or failure of public debt
policy can be determined only in relation to the aggregates of
national Income and its distribution. Whether or not the public
debt should be reduced depends on the general economic
situation, not on principles applicable to private commercial
accounting. Economic activity in the government sector is not
sustained out of private economic activity; it Is an
independent sector in the production of goods and services.
'. overmnent outlay financed by debt creation will increase the
level of national income, regardless of the productivity of the
assets which may be acquired.
Dr. Hansen also pointed out that the limits to the
public debt must be determined in relation to the nation's
taxable capacity, the danger of price inflation, and the
distribution of income; the limits are flexible and not fixed.
The implementation of compensatory fiscal policy requires a
recasting of traditional budgetary policy, in order to view the
expenditure and receipts side of government budgets in relation
to the total level of economic activity.
The new philosophy, using 1937 as an example, believed
that deficit reduction, whether it be increased taxes, reduced
expenditures, or combination thereof, is deflationary in effect




About this time there was a growing emphasiB being
placed upon the "assets" created by public debts. Regardless
of their character, it was widely believed that all public
outlays were really Investments. Having reached this point,
it was an easy step to the proposition that all increases in
public expenditures represent Income to someone and that all
reductions in public expenditures represent loss to someone.
The maturing of this new concept was delayed until the
war paved the way for an unlimited expansion of public credit.
Vast inoreases in public expenditures wiped out unemployment
and gave us a great increase in national production. Although
precisely the same thing happened in former wars, it appeared
to be assumed by advocates of the new school that something
unique had been discovered during the years of v<orld War II.
Holders of the old ideas were shocked at such assumptions.
They said:
It should be apparent without argument that the present war
[ orld War II] experience has merely confirmed what was
already known, namely, that a great expansion of employment
can be provided by unlimited expenditures of public funds.
But neither in this nor other countries has the war
experience shed any light on the question whether public
deficits can be continued indefinitely without undermining
the financial and economic system.^
In recent years the idea that federal budgets should be
balanced every year has gradually given way to the still
controversial theory that budgets should be balanced over the
years of the business cycle. That is, it is all right to have
deficits in a recession as long as they are offset by surpluses
:>ulton, op. olt. . pp. 13-19.
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in good years, yielding a net balance or surplus at the end
of the cycle.
President Kennedy Indorsed this theory In one of his
first official statements concerning budget policy in larch,
1961, In his Message to Congress on Budget and Fiscal Policy
on farch 24, 1961, he said:
The Federal budget— should, apart from any threat to
national security, be in balance over the years of the
business cycle, running a deficit In years of recession,
when revenues decline and the economy needs the stimulus
of additional expenditures, and running a surplus in years
of prosperity, thus curbing inflation, reducing the public
debt and freeing funds for private investment.'
t the theory of achieving a net balance or surplus
over the cycle has not worked out, at least, not to the present.
When the economy is prosperous and produces increased tax
receipts, the government spends most of the increase or turns
it back to the public through tax cuts instead of using it to
pay off debts incurred during recessions.
Now even before the cyclical theory has won universal
acceptance, the present administration 13 pressing the newer
idea that deficits are healthy during ln-betifeen years of the
cycle.
It is not enough to have deficits just in recessions,
acoording to some administration policy-makers; it may be
necessary also to stimulate business activity with deficit
spending in periods like the present, when the economy is
rising but has not yet achieved full employment of labor and
1fi,uJohn tf. Gardner (ed.), To Turn the Tide (New York:




If the government tries to balance the budget too early
In the upswing phase of the business cycle, the administration
fears the economy will level off and start declining before
its complete recovery from the last recession. In other words,
the next recession would start prematurely.
This present situation will be discussed more fully in
a later chapter, /.(hat has been intended here is to show the
change in philosophy which we have undergone in recent years






Many a citizen will never be able to understand fully
the problem of the public debt
. . .
'
Professor Paul A. Samuelson, a noted economist at K.I.T. and
the author of a widely used textbook in United States colleges,
says:
No beginner can be expected to master all of the
intricacies involved in correct appraisal of the public
debt. 2
This is what two authorities of economics Involved
in the national debt have to say concerning the details of the
problem Sharing their opinions, the details involved in the
various philosophies have been omitted because they serve no
purpose for the objective herein.
In appraising the burdens Involved in a public debt, we
must carefully avoid the unscientific practice of making
up our minds in advance that whatever is true of one small
merchant's debt is also necessarily true of the government's
debt. Prejudging the problem in this way comes perilously
close to the logical fallacy of composition; and, instead
of permitting us to isolate the true--all too real!--
burdens of the public debt, may only confuse the issue.
3
'James ... 3uchanan, Public Principles of Public Debt
(Homewood, I'll.: Richard D. Irwin, 194J, p. 1.
^Paul A. Samuelson, 5conomlca--An Introductory Analysis





This may well be one of the basic problems that faces
us today. Too many have pre- judged the new philosophy without
understanding it or hearing it out. Maybe it is not all bad
or as bad as some seem to suggest.
If the alarmist is not right, the pollyanna may be
equally wrong. One should not say merely that the national debt
is good or bad, helpful or harmful, destructive of private
enterprise, or indispensable to its maintenance.
Economic problems are not solved so simply. It is not
like measuring the specific gravity of iron or the temperature
of an animal. In fact, it is not clear that the community
would be better off without debt accumulation any more than it
is clear that private enterprise would be better off without
its debt. In appraising the debt, it is necessary to take into
account the gains from accumulation of debt, and there are
gains, as well as the cost of financing the debt. For the debt,
there are certain assets: a decisive victory in war, the rise
of physical assets, favorable effects upon income and savings,
and medical and sociological gains associated with reduced
unemployment.
Variety In Viewpoint
The financial purist, always adverse to debt, views
debt growth in war with uneasiness; but he has no alternative
other than to acquiesce. He will indeed urge heavier taxation
and economies in expenditures; but within broad limits, there
la little that he can do about wartime borrowing and wartime
public debt, which he accepts as a necessary evil. Borrowing

20
in peacetime, on the other hand, he considers an evil, neither
necessary nor acceptable—t® him it is an abomination.
Increased attention to government deficit financing
stems from the change in emphasis which might quite properly be
associated with the Keynes Ian revolution. Classical economists,
in arguing against accumulation of public debt, generally
assume full employment, inelastic monetary supplies,
unproductiveness of public expenditure for purposes other than
defense, Justice, etc. Therefore, they object to government
borrowing; in their view, the government, by borrowing and by
taxing to defray interest payments, deprives the economy of
cash and capital, and the government's use of resources is less
productive than that by private enterprise.
But the classicists 1 assumption of full employment and
inelasticity of monetary supplies is unrealistic. Once the
economist, In a more realistic mood, allows for unemployment,
assumed elasticity in monetary supplies, and agrees that
government expenditures could be productive and need not
necessarily be wasteful, the case for public borrowing is
strengthened. The cash obtained by the government might come
from unemployed cash, or out of additional deposits created by
banks; and the labor and capital put to woric by government
might otherwise have been unemployed. Government might thu3,
through the borrowing process, increase the output of goods and
raise real income; and in so doing, it would obtain the means
of financing the public debt. Above all, it seems wasteful and
fooli3h to tolerate large amounts of unemployment if, by
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government borrowing and an ensuing rise of demand, unemployed
resources oould be put to work—and this without national
bankruptcy or anything approaching it.
Rise of Debt in Peacetime
The general public, at least to some extent, seems
worried over today's national debt; but even more than over
the high level of today's debt, the public is worried lest the
debt continue to grow. They fear this continued growth, not
only because of the financial commitments involved, but also
because of the crushing weight on wealth and Income.
Furthermore, they are fearful of the increased participation
of government in economic life, with resulting reduced areas
for private enterprise. The thesis that private enterprise is
unable to carry on and provide the minimum standards of output
and employment, without which capitalism cannot survive, is
challenged by the ant i-spenders. They are impressed by the
restraints put upon private enterprise by governmental measures,
by the inoreased contribution that might be made by price
flexibility and unlimited competition, and by the insatiable
demand for American and even foreign products. They argue that
increased governmental participation is not required, that the
system of private enterprise is sufficiently resilient and
automatic so that, given the proper political environment, the
goods produced will find a market at profitable prices.
On what grounds, on the other hand, do the protagonists
of public debt take their stanu? They point to past
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relationships of Income and spending and conclude that, at the
high Incomes necessary to assure high levels of employment,
private spending would be Inadequate. Therefore, they propose
a socialization of demand, I.e., support of demand through
governmental deficit spending, which, in their view, Is the way
to prevent a cumulative decline. These proponents of debt
accumulation, for the most part, would not rely exclusively upon
the growth of debt; they would take other measures (reduction
of interest rates, reduced taxes on the masses, expanded social
security) which strengthen the propensity to spend.
The supporters of deficit financing point to the crucial
relation between national income and the debt charge; as long
as the former rises adequately, a growing debt need not be
feared. In fact, they contend that debt growth stimulates the
rise of income, and that this increased Income provides the
source from which the increased debt is financed. Adherents
of this position point to the history of real income, which over
a period of eighty years prior to World War II rose greatly,
doubling itself on the average of every fifteen years.
Supporters of the new views point specifically to the
growth of income in Great Britain in the hundred years
preceding World war I, from 1314 to 1914: the British were
saddled with a crushing debt of 340 million pounds, the
financing of which in 1313, absorbed almost 3% of the national
income. Yet, in 1913, ninety-five years later, though but one-
quarter of the debt had been repaid, its financing required less
than %% of the national income—and this despite a large fall in
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prices. ^ If, like the protagonists of deficit financing, we
examine historic episodes, we can better understand their
position. Give the country good management of the economy, and
we shall have rising inooraes; and with rising incomes, an
increase in debt up to the amounts actually needed to assure
adequate levels of output and employment can be accepted without
fear.
The public debt has been analyzed by economists from two
basic points of view. On the one hand, orthodox economists
regard the debt with fear, advise its early retirement, and
ascribe to Its unfortunate economic effects such as
restriction of production, loss of business confidence and
incentive, and greater inequality of wealth. Their public
debt policy would consist of limitation and rapid repayment.
On the other hand, unorthodox economists do not fear the
debt, but consider it an essential instrument to ward off
depressions and maintain purchasing power. A middle
position would recognize the economic potentialities of the
public debt while giving due consideration to it3 dangers.
The debt may be an instrument for great good or evil. Its
various economic effects must be understood to avoid the
evil and promote the good.
5
Related to the subject are the effects of interest
payments on total spending* Here much depends on distribution
of government securities and tax structure. The presumption
even today is that the interest payments are on balance from
potential spenders to potential savers. Taxation of income
received as interest on the debt, however, tends to reduce the
adverse effects—both because net Interest is reduced and
because other idle savings are taxed away.
3amuelson, op. clt. . pp. 400-401.
illiam thithers, Public Finance (New York: American




On© could continue because there Is no lack of
viewpoint on this problem and Its consequences. Our trouble Is
that we have not found the middle or the best road, and Judging
from what has been transpiring over the past thirty years, the
best road Is not on our map. The driver has been going along
the road he thought best for his or our purposes. Because
there has not been unanimity, the road has been beset with
detours, and other barricades which have delayed our progress,
W© do not suggest that we take a view far from either
extreme, out of preference for a middle ground, but out of
belief that the facts do not warrant either complacency or
despair.
Responsible observers agree that there are many
problems to be resolved concerning the national debt. They
hold that under prudent management these problems can be, and
to some extent, are being solved.
Sound principles of debt management, faithfully applied,
can eliminate the potential dangers of a large national
debt. Understanding these principles will snow where
the practical problems lie.
Economists may be criticized ... if they fail to
acknowledge that there are problems associated with an
expanding debt. It is an error to recommend fiscal
policy which requires a deficit without considering
both negative and positive effects.
<
° arshall A. Hobinson, The National Debt Celling—An
Experiment In Fiscal Policy (Washington, D.O.: The Brookings
Institution, 1959), p. 61.
^Richard 3. Bower, Associate Professor of Business
Economics, Dartmouth College, "Letters to the Editor," >all
Jtreet Journal . February 28, 1963, p. 16.
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Good debt management Is predicated on understanding of
its economic effects, 3ut unfortunately there is no
unanimity of opinion among economists concerning these
effects. The theory of public debts has gone through
many changes from the days of David Hume to those of Lord
Keynes. One common point of agreement has been reached,
however. Public debt can no longer be regarded as
uninfluentlal in economic life and wise debt management
is essential for the economic health of a nation. 3
-ith such sentiments existing in the minds of many
writers on the debt subject, it appears that there is a middle
road. The problem seems to be in finding it and determining
where it might lead. In the process, it is suggested that
perhaps some rebuilding will be required to insure that it is
basically satisfactory to all who will go along with the driver.




The Driver "akes His Choice
lth the previous discussion behind us, what Is the
situation today? Are we, as a nation, accepting the new
economics and going merrily on our spending way without regard
for the future? Or, are we trying to keep expenditures down
to reasonably considered limits? There is no question that
government spending since the Korean police action has
exceeded the revenues, but not much uproar has arisen from the
people because there was token effort to balance the budget.
Sputnik I helped in keeping the people quiet because here was
an event or a new era where we were not number one, something
most of us have taken somewhat for granted. Two World WarB
gave us this confidence and now suddenly someone was ahead in
a race unheard of Just a few short years before.
We had to move if we were going to catch up or close
the gap. This was an emergency of some sort, so a few more
billions, to an already enormous debt, did not seem so terrible.
As a result, public opinion remained quiet on the subject;
whatever was done was accepted by the majority as being
necessary.




play a regarding this question. Reference to current
administration policy, however, is necessary to bring out the
facts. Had the last Presidential election taken a different
turn, there would undoubtedly be a difference in policy.
However, it is suggested that the same conditions would be still
evident, the only difference being in degree.
In a Bpeech in Columbia, South Carolina, on October 10,
during the campaign in i960, the then Senator Kennedy said:
I am just as opposed as v.r, Nixon to unbalanced budgets
and to Federal deficits, 1
Earlier, during a question and answer session on
state-wide television at Seattle, Washington, on September 6,
i960, the question:
Sen. Kennedy, in your attainment of the suggested program
of the new frontier, what safeguards, if any, are you
proposing to avoid an unhealthy inflation or an unhealthy
national debt?
was answered by r. Kennedy as follows:
I et me say that I think it is extremely important that the
U.S. maintain to the extent possible, a sound fiscal policy
and a balanced budget. There are only two reasons, in my
opinion, for an unbalanced budget. One, if there is a
•eat national emergency requiring an expenditure by the
Federal Government to protect the security of the U.S., or,
two, if there is serious unemployment which requires
action by the Federal Government.
2
These statements, granted they were political campaign
remarks, indicate our current administration's feeling on the
1 U,S., Congress, Senate, Freedom of Communications
—
Final Report of the Com-mittee of Commerce. Part I. The Speeches .
Remarks. Press Conferences and otatementa of Sen. John F.
Kennedy. Auh;. 1 through Nov. 7, i960 (Washington. J. J.:
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 549.
2Ibld. , p. 136.
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subject at that time.
After over a year and a half in office, President
Kennedy addressed the nation on August 13, 1962, promising to
recommend to Congress a top-to-bottom cut in personal and
corporate income taxes, to become effective in January, 1963.
The President highlighted the economic case for tax reduction
in these words:
Our tax rates, in short, are so high as to weaken the very
essence of the progress of a free society, the incentive
for additional return for additional effort.
For these reasons, this Administration intends to cut
taxes in order to build the fundamental strength of our
economy, to remove a serious barrier to long term economic
growth, to increase incentives by routing out inequities
and complexities, and to prevent the even greater budget
deficit that a lagging economy would otherwise surely
produce.
3
This could well have been the beginning of a discussion
which will hold the public interest for many months to come,
particularly through the first session of the 38th Congress,
ost statistics indicate economic activity is on the
move upward, olnce there is no recession indicated, this is
the ideal time to put the cyclical theory to work and use
planned surpluses for debt reduction.
However, for the first time in our history we have a
President who is proposing tax cuts in a period of prosperity
and budget deficits. The administration maintains that big
deficits, with enlarging tax cuts, are healthy and necessary
in the situation today,
^U.3., Congressional Fie cord . 37th Cong., 2d Uess.,
1962, Vol. 108, No. 143, P- 15479.
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The real showdown has not arrived, but the debate has
already begun with surprising, if not overwhelming, support
cosing from those who have been brought up to fear debt and
practice frugality. The old philosophy, maybe not to that
extreme, but at least not the new "spend yourself out of
recession" idea, is still in evidence.
Dr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman of President Kennedy's
Council of Economic Advisors, and the man largely responsible
for the tax reduction movement, said on January 23, 1963:
I think it is quite remarkable that the basic puritan
ethic of the American people should be such that they want
to deny themselves tax reductions because of (a) their
fears of deficits, and the additions to the national debt;
and (b) because they do not understand that their spending,
in effect, makes this contribution to the national growth
and full employment, 4"
Dr. Heller argues that the United states economy has
consistently fallen short of its employment, production, inoome,
and profits goals in the past five years. The economy can be
pushed toward more robust activity in three main ways by
enacting a sizable cut in tax liabilities in the households
and businesses throughout the nation. First, it would Increase
the disposable income of the consumers, giving them more
spending power. Second, by strengthening sales and pushing
output closer to capacity, tax reduction spurs investment in
inventories and in new equipment and new plants. Third, by
reducing personal and corporate taxea, profit margins increase
for businessmen and the supply of internal business funds
Salter W. Heller, as quoted in "Thrift vs. Borrowing,"




available for investment la enlarged.
5
In my Judgment, reduction of our tax overburden will be
a prompt and effective spur to our lagging economy,
°
President Kennedy submitted his fisoal year 1964 budget
to Congress on January 13, 1962, Several quotes from his
message were:
Our present choice is not between a tax cut and a
balanced budget. The choice rather, is between chronic
deficits arising out of a slow rate of economic growth,
and temporary deficits stemming from a tax program designed
to promote fuller use of our resources and more rapid
economic growth.
7
ur practical choice is not between a deficit and a
budgetary surplus. It is instead between two kinds of
defioits: a chronic deficit of inertia due to inadequate
economic growth—or a temporary deficit resulting from a
tax and expenditure program designed to provide for our
national security, boost the economy, increase tax revenue,
and achieve future budget surpluses. The first type of
deficit is a sign of waste and weakness. The second is an
investment in the future,"
President Kennedy also discussed the necessity for an
increase to the temporary debt celling for the remainder of the
fiscal year. Without such action, sound management of the
government's finanoes would be impossible during the April-
June, 1963 period. He also noted that further increases would
be necessary during the period of his budget and such a request
would be made when more reliable estimates were available.
^
, A, Heller, "May We Kust Cut Taxes," Nation's
Business . Vol. 50 (November, 1962), pp. 40ff.
6 Ibid. , p. 40.
7u.S., Congressional Record . 88th Cong., 1st Jess.,
1963, Vol. 109, No. 6, p, 482,
8Ibld. . p. 438. 9Xbld. . p. 487,
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This yearly issue in Congress about the federal debt
limit and government spending was raised earlier than usual
this year. The temporary celling was raised twice in 1962,
once to meet fiscal 1962 requirements, and once to meet
anticipated fiscal 1963 needs. The second raise set the limit
at .$308 billion, but also provided a sliding scale by which the
ceiling would be gradually reduced to the permanent §865 billion
by July 1, 1963. The fiscal 1963 increase now is expected to
be insufficient because of the budget deficit for the year.
When Congress passed the fiscal 1963 increase, the late
Senator Robert 3. 'err, floor manager for the bill, predicted
a further increase would be necessary soon after the 88th
Congress met in 1963. 10
At debt celling hearings before the House ways and
Cleans Committee on May 31, 1962, Secretary of the Treasury
Douglas C. Dillon, in answer to the question as to what purpose
the debt coiling served, replied:
I think that is the only purpose that the debt limit,
itself, serves, namely, to have a full chance to debate and
talk about overall fiscal problems. 11
This discussion on the debt celling suggests that it
really is not serving any purpose. When the President tells the
Congress that his budget will not keep the debt within the
10m Issues Facing 88th Congress," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report . Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January 4, 1963),
P. 3.
1 *U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Temporary
Increase in Debt Celling—Hearings before the Committee on V/aya
and leans . 87th Cong.. 2d Sees., :ay 31 and June 1 t 1962. p. 17.
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established celling, the Congress has two obvious choices:
raise the limit or cut the budget.* 2
In his closing statement on January 17, 1963, concerning
the public debt, President Kennedy said:
In the future, as in the past, debt management policies
will be directed toward assuring that any increase in the
debt will be so distributed In its ownership and
composition as to promote continued price stability in
the economy.*
3
It seems clear, then, that the administration has made
its decision in accordance with the beliefs of the new
economics. The administration is pressing to use deficit
financing to give the economy the "shot in the arm" that many
believe it needs.
The Voices Are Raised
Reaotlons to the President's budget message, both
adverse and enthusiastic, cut across party lines. '.Vhile both
Democrats and Republicans offered blistering criticism of the
proposed deficit, other Democrats thought the measures to
stimulate the economy were not radical enough, and some liberal
Republicans praised many of the specific proposals. Some of the
specific comments made were:
Speaker of the House John W, McCormack (Mass.) said the
Budget was "sound and progressive" and offered "every
prospect of introducing a new era of economic growth."
However, Rep. Clarence Cannon (Ko.), chairman of the
powerful House Appropriations Committee, found the 3udget
"loaded with waste." He said the U.S. was "spending money
we do not have for things we could get along without."
12of., Robinson, op. clt. . pp. 101-104.
13u.S., Congressional Record . Vol. 109, No. 6, p. 437.
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Senate Minority Leader Everett cKinley Dirksen (111.) said
the budget deficit was "incredible" and showed that it was
easier to trim the taxpayer than federal spending. AFL-
CIO President 3-eorge Meany said the budget left the economy
"stalled on the side of a mountain" and called for more
radical measures to speed the rate of economic growth.
^
In recognition of the criticism, particularly from
congressmen, of proposing tax cuts when the budget was
considerably out of balance, the President said in his economic
message on January 21, 1963, that:
... in today's eoonomy, fiscal prudence and responsibility
call for tax reduction even if it temporarily enlarges the
Federal Deficit.
The President argued that the economy had been
sliding into one deficit after another through repeated
recessions and persistent slack in our economy.
He said a new recession "could break all peace-time deficit
records." Guts in the budget, which the President said would
"necessarily" be in defense and other "vital" programs, would
endanger the country and reduce demand, production, and
employment, cut tax revenues, and still leave a budget deficit.
As in his budget message, he cautioned against deficits
of "inertia and weakness" resulting from unused economic
capacity. Rather, temporary budget defiolts would eventually
produce surpluses as the economy picked up, he said. 1 5
The reader is probably well aware of the variety of
opinions that exist on the tax cut and reform bill being
^"Budget, State of the Union message Debated,"
Congressional Quarterly .veelsly Report . Vol. XXX, No. 3
(January 13, 1963), p. 52.
1 5u,S., Congressional Record . Vol. 109, No. 8, p. 677.
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considered by the present Congress, and its ultimate effect on
the economy and the debt. What may also be apparent but not
quite so readily, is the fact that there is no solid front of
thinking along political, labor, industry, or such other lines
one might wish to consider.
There can never be complete agreement on anything of
such enormous proportions as our country* s fiscal policies,
and, as a matter of fact, there should not be. President
Kennedy talks of "fiscal prudence"; it stands to reason that
he must have chosen his advisors in this area with care so that
this objective would be maintained. But something is terribly
wrong when we have such violent opposing positions that lead
honored statesmen publicly to denounce our President's choice
of advisors, or his policies on an issue that should be a
united one.
Senator Harry F, Byrd (Democrat, Virginia), long an
advocate of a balanced budget and reduced debt, said in part
in a state&ent released to the press on January 31, 1963, in
comment on a statement made by the new Budget Director, r.
Kerns it Gordon:
I submit that a man who thinks a balanced budget would be
a catastrophe does not have the frame of mind to direct
the budget of the U.S. Government.
ach ideas as Xr. Gordon expresses sound like John : aynard
ynes and Gunnar "yrdal rolled Into one. Responsible
fiscal positions should be filled with sound men* If we do
not get crack-pot economists out of these positions, the
American system will be loat, 1 6
Statement by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D.-Va.), for
release to the press, Washington, D.C., January 31, 1963.
(Copy obtained from Senator Byrd's office.)
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Senator John J. Williams, speaking in the Senate on
January 31, 1963, about the proposed tax out, said in part:
At no time has any government—and it has been tried
several times before—ever been able to relieve unemployment
with deficits. It has never been possible for an individual
or a government to spend itself into prosperity with
borrowed money.
Unless some degree of fiscal sanity is restored at the
executive level our country can soon be confronted with a
real dollar oris is. 1 7
These statements may be disregarded as emotional,
political, or otherwise, but the fact remains that they are
being made and by many in all walks of life. One has only to
read the letters to editors in some of the better known
newspapers throughout the country if there is any doubt on
this point.
Comments such as:
I wish to ri3e In defense of the Puritans against whose
financial ethics Dr. Walter Heller Is taking such a snide
point of view. 1
8
bear this out. It would be unfair not to add that there are,
of course, supporters, in varying degrees, of the
administration's position.
For example, William F. Guozzi, Jr., Instructor of
Economics at Fairleigh-Dickinson University, In a letter to
Th
,
e Wall street Journal , wrote:
I am dismayed at the lack of understanding of basic
economic facts that exists not only among laymen but also
1?U.3,, Congressional Record . Vol. 109, No. 16,
pp. 1446-1447.
1
^Alan w cCracken, "Financial Religion," The Evening
Star (Washington, D.C.), rarch 7, 1963, p. A-12.
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among financial and editorial writers of our big daily
newspapers, .... This lack of understanding is
excusable in many instances, but certainly not when it
exists in those influential writers of newspapers such aB
yours,
A rising national debt will not bring disaster so long as
the national economy continues to grow.
In the case of where the economy is experiencing less than
full employment, such deficits are necessary and will not
cause marked inflation, 19
The editorial writer, commenting on the above letter, says:
certainly thought we had heard the last of that one.
We don't need to worry about the national debt because we
owe it to ourselves. For most people that cliche is long
since dead, though the theory behind it is unfortunatley
very much alive.
So if the old phrase is still going to be used, we should
at least bring it up to date, Ve owe It to ourselves to
start talking sense about the debt, 20
The writer visited the offices of six United States
aators on March 3, 1963, in an attempt to obtain some first-
hand information on the tax cut situation. While nothing
specific resulted from the visits, which incidentally were not
patterned on a scientific basis, but did include senators from
both parties in all sections of the country, the following can
be concluded.
At that time, the mail was coming in a steady, but
small volume. The heavy mail will come when the bill gets
closer to floor action. However, the indications were that
very few, less than \$ was reported in one office, were in
19iVilliam F. Cuozzi, Jr., Letter to the Editor, tell
street Journal . January 10, 1965, p. 16,
20
" Rev lew and outlook," ^all Street Journal . January
10, 1963, p. 16.
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complete support of the President. At the other end, the
outright opposition was somewhat greater but still a small
figure. The middle range of support or non-support, with
various stipulations involved, accounted for most of the
volume. As previously mentioned, nothing specific can be drawn
from these visits, but It Indicates that there are a
considerable number of people in this country who, for one
reason or another, are concerned about seeing our public debt
continue to rise.
ords written in 19^3, bring emphasis on this point.
Finally the National Debt, its size and its increase, is
important because nine out of ten of the American people
believe It is important. The problem of the National
Debt makes all the difference on earth to the future of
the . . sliaply because the people believe it makes a
difference. And in a democracy that is all that matters.
No political party or group can expect to hold the support
of the American electorate unless it can furnish that
electorate some answer other than oratory to the problem of
the public debt. 21
r. Voorhis wrote twenty years ago, but his words ring true
today.
In the administration's two-day presentation of the
tax program's details on February 6 and 7> 1963, before the
House Ways and Means Committee, Treasury Secretary Douglas
Dillon said that a total revenue loss to the government of #10
to t'10.5 billion was as large as would be fiscally responsible.
Sarly in his remarks, ; r. Dillon emphasized that he
did not believe that the fiscal 1964 budgetary deficit, which
21 Jerry Voorhis, Out of Debt. Out of Danger (New York:
The Devin Adair Co., W3), p. 226.
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would result In part from tax reduction and In part fron
government spending la excess of revenues under current tax
rates, would contribute to inflationary pressures. 22
The Joint Senate-House Republican leadership report of
February 3 called the Kennedy Administration's program of
tax reduction and Increased government spending in fiscal
54 "undoubtedly the biggest economic gamble in the
history of nations/' The SGF policy statement said the
Administration "Is engaging In a desperate kind of
economic**, because It has no solution to the unemployment
problem." It said "the policy embraces no tried economic
formula, in fact it runs counter to economic experience
in the expansion of the Job market. Its principle novelty
is the creation of a giant deficit by a tax cut.
The statement said that "full prosperity could be the
product of sound fiscal practices, of tax reduction
accompanied by a reduction in federal spending, of
policies that create confidence in Government instead of
doubt and uncertainty. 23
On the other hand, as one would expect, the President's
Advisory Committee on Labor-r.ana^ement Policy supported the tax
reduction program. They are convinced more than ever of the
24
need for prompt and effective action on a tax cut.
The Tax Foundation, a non-profit research organization
which has as its goal giving assistance in the development of
more efficient government at the least cost to the taxpayer,
said that federal tax cuts
not matched by federal spending reductions . . . can
scarcely justify endless and large deficits.
-2U.J., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Ways and 'eans, Hearings . Tax Program . 83th Cong., 1st 3es«. f
1963, Part I.
^"Administration Tax Proposal Hearings '^pen, M
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , Vol. XXX f No. 7




Repeated deficits will discourage progress toward tax
modernization. 25
The American Farm Bureau called for an $11,8 billion
cut in the proposed fiscal 1964 budget. This would bring the
budget into balance and create a more favorable situation for a
tax reduction, 26
writing to The .mil Street Journal . Richard B. Bower,
Associate Professor of Business Economics at Dartmouth College,
sums up his remarks with the following conclusions: The
experience of the depression and the war are not conclusive
evidence, but they do suggest that unbalanced budgets can
encourage growth and employment without leading to runaway
inflation. Certainly there are periods when a tax cut can do
more harm than good, but it seems unlikely that we are now in
one of these periods. He also believes tnat it is unwise to
oppose a policy that may move a lagging economy forward because
of an unsupported fear that all deficits must be dangerous. 2?
Professor Sari Latham, Professor of Political icience
at Amherst College, believes that the huge deficits ahead,
particularly immediately after a big tax cut, are of little
concern to the mass of voters.
People don't look at the price list as much as what is
being offered. In the 1930' s there was great resistance
to deficit spending and predictions of collapse, ut
the country wants to buy now. It's almost impossible
25Ibld . 26 Ibld. . p. 199.
'Bower, on. olt .
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to translate the budget enormities into terms that ar«
understandable, 23
That which has just preceded is only a small sample
of the comments concerning tax cuts and our national debt,
which are being made here early in 196*3. If anything is to be
concluded, It can only be that we do not have a united front
on this subject. In fact, with all the provisos different
people or groups offer as their method of handling the dilemma,
it is difficult to find a line of demarcation between the pros
and the cons.
srriman Smith, writing in a recent issue of Nation*
s
3ualne8 3 . sums up this potpourri of thinking very well.
It's possible that history will prove :;r. Kennedy and
his economists to be essentially sound in their beliefs
that striving for federal budgetary balance this or next
year could trigger a real recession. It's also possible
that time will prove the President to be right about the
harmless nature of running several more large federal
deficits— if this policy strengthens the economy and helps
to increase national productivity*
while waiting for hi3tory and time, however, Rep.
Mills and his opposite number in the Senate, Chairman Harry
F, 3yrd of the finance Committee, are not disposed to rush
into tax reduction unless "ir, Kennedy pulls down federal
expenditures appreciably, 29
^"Authorities Forecast: Prospects for Kennedy
Program," Nation's business . Vol, 51, No. 1 (January, 1963),
pp, 42-44.
29;;erriman Smith, "Trends: aahington Kood," Mat ion 'a





It may seem presumptuous to suggest a solution to the
reader, who by now must certainly be wondering what can be done
about this oonfuslns atmosphere we are In, However, if the
writer has been successful in the foregoing to make the reader
look at the problem from an unbiased viewpoint, that is a start.
It almost seems too obvious to say, but the fact 1b that we
have to get together and discuss our differences on any matter,
and we generally have to give and take if any kind of
satisfactory action is to result from the discussion.
The writer considers this national debt involvement
something which deserves our immediate attention if we are to
continue our world leadership. It Is not an issue to be used
in political tactics, nor one that can be allowed to drift
aimlessly, as it has for some years now. Even though we have
our different points of view, we as a nation are quick to unite
when our national image is threatened. We are quick to realize
that our internal differences will hinder our national
objectives, and we therefore put them in the background until
the emergency is over. One does not have to go back very far




hj then have we failed to realize that the very basis
of our national strength is vitally involved in the debt problem
and have not united to attempt to resolve it?
The fact that a United States President and his closest
advisors want something for the good of the country, and a large
portion of the Congress and the people are not in agreement
because of doubts as to what the outcome will be, is not so
disturbing as the fact that we apparently are not making any
progress in resolving the matter. The President's tax program
is receiving prominent attention throughout the country, but
the end result will be an emotionally decided compromise which
will satisfy neither side,
Gould Lincoln in his column "The Political rill,"
writing on the subject "Tax Reduction a Football," ends his
column by saying:
In the midst of all this uncertainty—the only thing that
seems certain is there will be a tax reduction of one kind
or another, notwithstanding all the conflicting forces.
It will be welcomed, and it Is honed, beneficial .
1
This is not an acceptable mean3 of solution to a
problem of this magnitude. We have to chart a course and stay
on it at least until there Is valid reason to change. It was
suggested earlier that we have not had a course to follow, and
the road we have been following is beset with detours.
r« Jesse Burkhead, writing in 1959, seemed to be
suggesting the same thing when he wrote:
^ould Lincoln, "The Political .;ill," The Evening Star
(Washington, D.C.), larch 21, 1963, p. A-6, (Underline mine.)
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This would seen* to be the remaining and challenging
task for the critics of conservative fiscal policy: to
provide a guide to governmental budgeting which will serve
two purposes simultaneously. The first purpose is to guide
the transfer of resources from the private to the public
sector; the second is to guide the selection of the
aggregate level of receipts and expenditures, with a view to
stabilization. The guidelines must be widely understood
and capable of political implementation . Until this task
is done, we can confidently anticipate a continuation of
discussion over national debts and deficits, a discussion
which will abound in semantic confusion. 2
Reaching our Ooals
Before we suggest an answer, a possible method to follow
in dealing with this situation, it would be well to explain why
it is of such concern, tfhy should a military man in the
business of being extravagant, as so many accuse, be concerned?
As long as the military gets the bulk of the budget, what is
the axe that has to be ground?
Very simply, it is this, oome wise council has
convinced the author that there is generally more than one
solution to every problem Some are better than others, of
course, but there is more than one answer. The writer, having
been one who was an ant 1-spender and in fear of a huge national
debt, has seen validity in some of the new ideas. Now he wants
to know if some of the new thinking should not be used to
advantage rather than continually to be justifying itself to
the old and thereby losing its benefits in the process.
In the current situation, even if the administration's
program is the best answer, there is little chance of its being
2Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting; (New York: John




Leland Hazard, Director-Consultant of the Puttsburgh
Plate Glass Company, Professor of Industrial Administration and
Law at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and Vice Chairman
of the National Planning Association, asked about a year ago,
"Can We Afford Our National ioals?"3
In his article he reviewed our history and our ability
to do the Impossible again and again. He likens the United
States to a man who at some time between the ages of forty-five
and sixty discovers that he must ration his strength; he finds
that we are beginning to take inventory. Can we achieve all
our goals at once? That is the question that now begins to
nag us.
He relates that in the years from Hiroshima to the
present, our historical position of seourity behind our two
oceans has shifted to one of open vulnerability to nuclear
attack. V/e have come in a very short time from a sense of
omnipotence to an ominous doubt about our very survival. And
finally, we are half-baffled by a dilemma. If we do gird
ourselves for the garrison state—determined at all costs to
survive—will we lose so much in the process that survival will
be worthless? And if we do gamble everything on survival, when
shall we know the outcome?
It is not so simple a case as to risk all on one tos3
of the coin. For it may be that in the lifetime of the
youngest of us neither heads nor tails will come up.
^Leland Hazard, "Can We Afford our National Goals?,"




Twenty-five years ago it might well have been impose ible
to cost America's goals. 3ut today we possess the
measurement and projection techniques with which to appraise
a balance between our aspirations and our resources. It is
remarkable that in a practical America no agency-
governmental or private—has performed this obviously
sensible and neoessary function,^
It is impossible to include all of Professor Hazard's
ideas herein, but the goals should be in the minds of everyone.
He discusses the fifteen goals, both at home and abroad, which
President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals presented
in I960, adds one from the Kennedy administration, and attempts
to put a price tag on them. Just to list them is not as
meaningful as reading his article, but briefly the goals are:
I. GOALS AT HOME
1
.
The Individual—The status of the
individual must remain our primary concern.
2. Equality— .ve must sharply lower those
last stubborn barriers of religious prejudice, employment
handicaps for women, and racial discrimination.
3. The Democratic Process—The degree of
effective liberty available to its people should be the
ultimate test for any nation.
4. Education—The development of the
individual and the nation demands that education at every level
and in every discipline be strengthened and its effectiveness
enhanced.





Imowledge must be advanced on every front.
6, The Democratic Economy—The economic
system must be compatible with the political system.
7» Economic Growth—-The economy should grow
at the maximum rate consistent with primary dependence on free
enterprise and the avoidance of mar teed inflation,
8, Technological Change—Change should be
promoted and encouraged as a powerful force for advancing our
economy.
9. Agriculture—A supply-demand equilibrium
to permit the market to determine the manpower and capital
—
committed to this sector of the economy.
10. Living Conditions—Remedy slum conditions,
reverse the process of decay in the larger cities, and relieve
the necessity for low income and minority groups to concentrate
in debilitated areas.
11. Health and Welfare—More doctors, nurses,
and medical facilities are needed to meet the enormously
increased demand for these services.
II. GOALS ABROAD
12. To Build an Open and Peaceful viorld.
13. To Defend the Free World.
14. Disarmament,
15. The united Nations,
16. Space, Including the ;:oon,5
5ibidt , pp. 10, 12, 14, 16, and 174.
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V.hat American can argue that theae indeed are necessary
and desirable goals? Professor Hazard did not put a price tag
on all of these objectives, but even at that, he projected an
annual requirement of 1300 billion. He says our democracy must
face a degree of discipline beyond our past custom. V« have to
analyze goals for priorities and analyze resource potentials
for enhancement.
jnce we have taken these steps, we then face the job
of disseminating the findings widely, effectively, and
forcefully.
6
Professor Hazard's concern that no agency has placed
priorities on our objectives, and determined how much of our
resources will be used, is in the same plane as the author's
concern with our handling of our finances. The time for
decision is now. That, of course, is easier said than done,
but without question, the time for action is now. t with tne
wide variety of opinion concerning our deot, however can we
hope to resolve our differences toward a national united effort?
New Technologies
A great deal is heard these days about operations
research and how it is used to compare not only alternative
ways to carry out a specified program, but also alternative
scales of that activity or alternative allocations of resources
among activities.
In a paper written in 1957* showing how operations
research can help in determining program sizes in the Forest
6Wd t , P. 174.
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Service, the author concluded:
How widely In government is this type of exhibit
feasible? This question cannot be answered at present.
• . . useful measures of performance appear to be feasible
in numerous activities.
. . . On the whole, the outlook for
budgetary exhibits of this sort Is surely hopeful, for the
techniques of operations research will make possible
Improved measures of
r
performance for an expanded list of
government programs.
7
A decision which is best for the organization as a
whole is called an optimum decision; one which is best relative
to the functions of one or more parts of the organization is
called a suboptlmum decision. The problem of establishing
criteria for an optimum decision is itself a very complex and
technical one. Operations research tries to find the best
decisions relative to as large a portion of a total
organization as is possible. Operations research attempts to
consider the interactions or chain of effects as far out as
these effects are significant.
The overlap of methods, techniques, and tools between
operations research and other fields la largely due to the way
in which operations research was Initially and is still carried
on. It is research performed by teams of scientists whose
individual members have been drawn from different scientific
and engineering disciplines. One might find, for example, a
mathematician, physicist, psychologist, and economist working
together on a problem of optimizing capital expansion. The
effectiveness of such inter-disolplinary teams in ttotaling the
"ftioland N. KoKoan, Operations Research and Sovernaent
Budgets ita Monica, California: The iiand Corp., Karon 7,
1957), p. 19* (Typewritten.)
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type of problem characterized as the subject matter of
operations research Is not accidental.
One of the major reasons for operations research teams
Is to bring the most advanced scientific procedures to bear on
the problem or to develop new procedures which are more
effective in approaching the problem than any that are
available, The idea is that no one mind can hold all the
potentially useful scientific information, but a "team mind"
may.
Another important advantage of the team approach lies
in the fact that most man-machine systems have physical,
biological, psychological, sociological, economic, and
engineering aspects. These phases of the system can best be
understood and analyzed by those trained in the appropriate
fields. Those in control of a system may be unaware of one or
more of these aspects and hence have an incomplete picture of
their system; that is, to see a system as a whole means not
only to see all of its components and their interrelationships,
but also all aspects of its operations. A mixed team increases
the number of aspects of the operation which can be examined in
detail. 8
Herburt P. Galliher, writing in a publication
consisting of artioles on operations research, says:
^Russell L. Acfcoff , E. Leonard Araoff, and C, West
Churchman, Introduction to Operations Research (New York:
John //Hey and ^ons, Inc., 1937) » pp. 3-19.
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Unfortunately for the merely curious mind, simulation
is an effective problem-solving technique in operations
research. Indeed, it represents an excellent experimental
medium by which to study the time-pattern of operational
events and the consequences , as they extend over a modeled
future, of decisions . '
John Fi lagee and :artln L« Ernst, in writing about
"The Challenge of the Future" for operations research, say:
. . .
Operations Research field is far from mature, that
challenging technical and professional opportunities exist
if the field is to meet the needs of management in a world
of dynamic change, where effective use of economic and
human resources and efficient planning in the face of
competition and uncertainty will determine industrial and
national survival.
As a professional field, our real responsibility is to use
these assets, developed so extensively in the fifties, to
support professional growth and to formulate the
experiments, conoepts, and method needed to meet the
challenge of the sixties. 10
This discussion of operations research is nothing more
than a layman's attempt to show what it is and what it is
capable of doing. Operations research is doing things today
that were not possible a year ago and the future should see
continued advances,
Leavitt and Whisler in their reasoned prediction about
the future talk about a new technology that does not yet have
a single established name, but which they call "information
technology." It is composed of several related parts.
^Notes on Operations Research. Assembled by the
operations Research Center, . assachusetts Institute of
Technology. (Cambridge, Mass,: The Technology Press, M.I.T.,
1959), p. 231. (Underline mine.)
*°Russell L. Aekoff (ed. ), Progress in Operations
Research (New York: John Wiley and Sons., Inc., 1961), p. 439.
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One includes techniques for processing large amounts
of Information rapidly, and it is epitomized by the high
speed computer, A second part centers around the
application of statistical and mathematical methods to
decision making problems; it is represented by techniques
like mathematical programming, and by methodologies like
operations research. A third part is in the offing, though
its applications have not yet emerged very clearly; it
consists of the simulation of higher-order thinking through
computer programs . 1
1
Team Effort
iflth these new approaches to problem solving a reality,
and with the federal government the biggest single user of the
new technologies, it should not be difficult to devote some of
these efforts to the national debt problem.
A team effort, ohartered Jointly by the executive and
legislative branches of the government, composed of leaders in
the fields of economics, finance, industry, labor, government,
and, of course, operations research to approach the problem
from all viewpoints, does not seem too unreasonable. Perhaps
the field is still laoking in its ability to cope with this
type of problem and its multitude of variables. However, this
has not stopped us in our space efforts and it should not stop
us here.
There is no need to draw a blueprint of their endeavors
but they should be directed toward seeking out a best route.
Under various established conditions, how much can we afford
now and for our future? Is more debt now, in building for the
11 Harold J. Leavltt and Thomas J. Whisler, "management
in the 1980's," Harvard .iuslness Review . Vol. 36, No. 6




next decade or two, Imperative? How much can we afford, not
only for defense, for apace, and for foreign aid, but also for
education, health and welfare, and living conditions? The
writer would be the first to say that this sounds ridiculous.
How can one possibly obtain agreement on such far-reaching
problems? However, it is suggested that it is a start. It is
action to tackle the problem from a purely scientific and
technical approach. It will eliminate the emotional and
political aspects which are so prevalent today and give us aome
boundaries within which we can establish our national
objectives. National objectives in this sense mean a united
effort with the executive and legislative branches working
together as they have done on many occasions in the past.
The wrong kind of Federal Budget today, no less than
the wrong kind of private economic policies today, means
the wrong kind of national economy tomorrow.
ir most urgent need today is to substitute a long-
range nation-wide purposefulness for short-range
improvisation, and to substitute consistent and unified
policies and programs for segmental conflicts and
unrelated efforts. 12
This is no easy task, but neither is placing a man on
the moon. Still, in that case we have an objective toward
which we are heading. The proposed committee could vary in
size as conditions dictate, but the nation must be assured that
every side has a voice. We must be advised of progress and
ultimate findings, and if necessary, have the ultimate decision
placed in our hands. 3ut we would have to be certain that the
1 Conference on Economic Progress, The Federal 3uda;et
and "The General welfare " (Washington, D.C.: Sy the author,
December, 1959), p. 74.
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choices and probable resulting effects could be thoroughly
understood by the masses.
It will take some doing and may never be achieved, but
at lea3t those of us who are concerned will have the knowledge
that the effort was made. Action in this direction could very
well give us a better idea about our capabilities, and above
all, we might find a way to put an end to some of the questions
which are going unanswered today.
One's conception of what is a good society is
inevitably subjective, and one's appraisal of the future
uncertain. My conception of the good society, and my
apprehension of the threats and the opportunities we
confront, lead me to believe that we are dangerously
short-changing ourselves on defense, foreign aid,
education, urban renewal, and medical services; that
we badly need the increase allocations to these and a
variety of other public tasks. And if I am concerned that
we ask the right questions, and that we pay attention to
the facts, it is no doubt partly because I am inclined to
think that once the Issues are clearly posed, more people
than not will tend to agree. 13
.r. Jator, and others too numerous to mention, might
see some of their questions answered, and most of us could feel
that at least we are doing something active to insure a strong
and prosperous United States for ourselves and our children.
^Francis M. Bator, The Question of Government





After one has attempted to bring Into focus a long-
standing problem and then glibly suggested a solution, what is
there to conclude? The conclusions reached in this work cannot
be considered original. In fact, the conclusions may be
apparent in varying degrees to a great number of Americans.
The writer, however, has come to the realization that something
that was very vague a few months ago, and carried with it a
sense of uneasiness, can now be approached with some hope for
the future.
If the writer has had any measure of success in his
writing, the following conclusions should be reasonably clear:
First, during the greater part of our government's
existence there has been an established policy regarding our
national debt.
3Cond, during the last thirty years this policy
ha3 become diffused with a multitude of opinions, so that today
we are wandering in the middle ground.
Third, this middle ground lies between wide
boundaries of opinion and it must be charted so that we have an
objective. Without a route there are numerous ways to go




Fourth, It Is very possible that the techniques
and machinery are available to assist in making the decisions
In charting the course.
And finally, the time for action is now. If we are to
hope to remain strong and leave our progeny a country worthy
of our tradition, we have to discontinue our aimless methods
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